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French academics reacted too announcements about a possible future European civil 
code ten years ago in the way in which Americans reacted to the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor 1940: first with shock, then with rearmament, finally with attempted 
counterattacks. Military metaphors abound. Yet the defense of the French Code Civil 
against a European civil code is tricky: they must defend one Code against another. The 
images drawn of codes are therefor of particular interest for our understanding both of 
civil codes and of legal nationalism. Often, two mutually exclusive images are presented 
at the same time. In cultural terms, the code civil is both traditional and revolutionary, 
both linguistically determined and independent of its language, both an expression of 
values and merely formal and neutral. Politically, the code civil is legitimated both in 
democracy and technocracy, it expresses both self-determination and imperialism, it is 
about both pluralism and universalism. Necessarily, in such juxtapositions, the same 
characteristics must be assigned to a European Code, making the arguments ultimately 
self-refuting. Nonetheless, the point is not to dismiss these defenses. Rather, they should 
be understood as expressions of faith—and the discussion over a European Code 
resembles, in part, a religious war. 
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Sometimes, the best way into a large subject is through a peripheral text. I choose a 
brief opening speech by Michel Albert, then President of the Académie des 
sciences morales et politiques, on the occasion of the bicentenary of the code civil 
in 2004.1 In the beginning, Albert emphasizes the intrinsic Frenchness, of the Code 
civil with a familiar quote from Portalis : “Les lois … doivent être adaptées au 
caractère, aux habitudes, à la situation du people pour lequel elles sont faites”.2 In 
the end of the talk, just a few lines later, Albert turns around completely and . 
praises the Code as a universal heritage: “le Code civil ne nous appartient pas à 
nous seuls Français — … il est une part de l’héritage de bien des nations”.3 
This ostensible inconsistency between a nationalist and an internationalist 
conception of the Code Napoléon is not a novelty. Napoleon himself pushed the 
Code civil as quintessentially French—and as the model for a European Code, of 
which he may have been the first proponent: 
Pourquoi mon Code Napoléon n’eût-il pas servi de base à un Code européen…? De la 
sorte, nous n’eussions réellement, en Europe, composé qu’une seule et meme famille. 
Chacun, envoyageant, n’eût pas cessé de se trouver chez lui.”4 
The Code thus combines, since its beginning, two seemingly incompatible 
qualities: it is at the same time quintessentially French, and quintessentially 
European. In this article, I want to take a closer look at this strange dialectic of 
nationalist and internationalist conceptions of the French civil code. I think this 
dialectic is more complex and thus more interesting than the frequently invoked 
dichotomy between euroskepticism and europhilia—a dichotomy that seems to 
assume that the Europe to be loved or hated is a fixed entity, not an idea to be 
shaped. And I also think this dialectic suggests a more complex role that 
                                               
1 Michel Albert, Allocution d’ouverture (2004),  
http://www.asmp.fr/fiches_academiciens/textacad/albert/code_civil.pdf. 
2 Albert (n. 1) 1. The reference is to Jean-Etienne-Marie Portalis, Discours préliminaire sur 
le Code Civil, in id., Discours, rapports et travaux inédits sur le Code Civil (1844, reprint 
2010) 1, 4-5. Cf. Book 19 of Charles Montesquieu’s “Esprit des lois”. 
3 Albert (n. 1) 3. 
4 Emmanuel de Las Cases, Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, vol. 7 (Paris: Lecointe 1828), 353 
Cf. Jean Bart, Le Code Napoléon, Un Code à vocation européenne?, in Jean-Philippe 
Dunand/Bénédict Winiger (eds.), Le code civil Français dans le droit européen (Bruylant 
2005) 65. 
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nationalism plays in the European private law project than as a mere barrier 
towards Europeanisation. 
For a long time, studies on national resistance to Europe focused especially on 
England and the common law. But the English opposition can easily (though 
perhaps falsely) be attributed to a clash of cultures or of styles, in particular civil 
versus common law, suggesting a European Code would be possible amongst the 
civil law countries.5 The fierce French resistance against such a Code suggests that 
this is not so easy.6 Its job is harder, however— it must contrast one Code (the 
Code civil) against another (the European). 
How can French scholars be opposed to something on the European level that they 
cherish at home? How are arguments against a European Code not at the same time 
arguments against a French Code? How can arguments in defense of the French 
Code be protected against appropriation by supporters of a European Code? The 
result of my analysis is: by flipping arguments. Flipping is a technique favored by 
critical legal studies: “appropriating the central idea of your opponent's argument-
bite and claiming that it leads to just the opposite result from the one she 
proposes.”7 What is remarkable in the French resistance is that French critics 
appropriate their own central ideas and turn them on their heads. The same author, 
sometimes within one same text makes both opposite arguments, without worrying 
about the internal inconsistency. 
Two caveats are in order. First, although I view the critics I use as quite 
characteristically French, I do not claim that they are representative of the French 
position at large, which is more varied and diverse. Second, although I focus 
disproportionally on the use of hyperbole (which is in general more common in 
France than elsewhere) and on internal inconsistencies in the arguments, my goal is 
not to criticize, or even ridicule, the positions expressed. The goal is a different 
one, and it is twofold. First, I want to demonstrate the internal friction in the idea of 
                                               
5 Mauro Bussani, Faut-il se passer du common law (européen)? Réflexions sur un code 
civil continental dans le droit mondialisé, (2010) 62 RIDC 7. 
6  An excellent collection of early French comments on the codification of European 
Private Law, both positive and negative, is Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson & Denis 
Mazeaud (eds), Pensée juridique française et harmonization européenne du droit (2003). 
7 Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, in Collected Courses of the Academy 
of European Law, Volume Ill, Book 2 (1994) 309, 335. 
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a Code itself, between particularity and universalism, that is reflected in this debate. 
Second, I want to demonstrate how this internal tension mirrors the difficulties of 
determining the place of the nation state within the European project today. Space 
constraints prevent comprehensive demonstration of the points made; I hope the 
imposed brevity at least makes my argument more pungent.  
 
II. French Positions between Nationalism and Internationalism 
Parallels between today’s situation and that of 1804 are revealing, but they have at 
least one important limitation. In 1804, when the French Civil Code was enacted, it 
clearly established France’s leading position in European private law. 
Anniversaries of the Code, however, were less fortunate. When the Code turned 
100, in 1904, the German civil code, entered into force just four years earlier, made 
the French Code look old and antiquated.8 In 2004, for the bicentennial, the 
situation was even worse. In that same year, the World Bank published its first 
Doing Business Report, which found civil law systems to be inferior to common 
law systems and ranked the French legal system forty-fourth—behind Jamaica, 
Botswana, and Tonga.9 Closer to home, the project of a European Code threatened 
to replace the French Civil Code altogether.  
The first shock for France had come some years earlier. The EU Commission 
inquiry on a European contract law in 2001 alreay created concern in France, where 
the Europeanization of private law had not been taken too seriously before.10 In 
2002 then Christian von Bar gave his now infamous presentation in Paris, in the 
                                               
8  Yves Lequette, D’une celebration à l’autre, in 1804-2004: Le Code civil—un passé un 
présent un avenir (2004) 9, 11-12. 
9 Doing Business in 2004: Understanding Regulation. On the French reactions, see, in 
English, Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson & Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson & Anne-Julie 
Kerhuel, Is Law an Economic Contest? French Reactions to the Doing Business World 
Bank Reports and Economic Analysis of the Law, (2009) 57 Am. J. Comp. L. 811; 
Catherine Valcke, The French Response to the World Banks’ Doing Business Reports, 60 
University of Toronto Law Journal 197 (2010).  
10 Even though the idea of a European private law, or even a codification, had been 
discussed in France before. See, the references in Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson, Faut-il 
un code civil européen?, RTDCil 2002, 463 no. 1 note 2. Christian von Bar himself had 
presented the project before, in French; see Christian von Bar, Le groupe d’études sur un 
Code civil, 53 REV. INT. DROIT COMP. 127 (2001). 
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Cour de Cassation, on the project of European codification.11 The existence of the 
project alone was a shock. That it was put forward by a German apparently 
resonated with memories of the German invasions into France in the past; the 
military language in some of the critiques suggests that much.12 But the real 
outrage appears to have been that Prof. von Bar spoke “en anglais, et ce dans la 
Grand’ Chambre de la Cour de cassation”13. 
It is hardly an exaggeration to compare the effect of that speech on the French 
academic establishment to that of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. An 
unexpected attack demonstrated that, unbeknownst to the victim, an enemy that had 
been ignored for a long time had already been arming itself for some time. And it 
was a dual archenemy from way back: Germany, von Bar’s home country, and 
England, the country whose language he spoke. The French reacted as the 
Americans reacted to Pearl Harbor: first with shock, then with their own 
rearmament, then with a counterattack.  
1. First Reaction: Shock and Outrage 
Speaking of attacks, rearmament, and archenemies may seem hyperbolic, but it 
merely reflects the style of the debate. One French scholar compares the project to 
unify European private law to the identity politics of Nazi Germany, the Soviet 
Union, and Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge14 - the European civil code as some 
kind of cultural genocide. Another scholar teaching in France calls the project 
                                               
11  Christian von Bar, Des principes à la codification: perspectives d’avenir pour le droit 
privé européen, Les Annonces de la Seine, 3 June 2002, no. 33, p. 1-4 ; republished as 
Christian von Bar, From Principles to Codification: Prospects for European Private Law, 
(2002) 8 Col. J. Eur. L.  379. 
12 The discussion is placed in the centuries old relation between France and Germany by 
Yves Lequette, De la France et de l’Europe: La nation ou l’empire, in Études à la mémoire 
du professeur Bruno Oppetit (2009) 411, where la nation stands for France, l’empire for the 
Holy Roman Empire, i.e. Germany. See especially ibid. 457 ff.  
13  Albert (note 1) 2; Yves Lequette, Quelques remarques à propos du projet de code 
civil européen de M. von Bar, Dalloz 2002 chron. 2202 = Pensée juridique (n. 6) 69, no. 1. 
Albert contrasts this to Basil Markesinis “Notons toutefois que notre confrère, lui, s’est 
exprimé en français.” Albert did not return the favor completely, he managed to misspell 
both Sir Basil’s first and last name (“Basile Marchesinis”). But then, Markesinis’s own 
spelling of foreign names is rarely accurate; see the examples in Ralf Michaels, Book 
Review, 10 ZeuP 903 (2002). For Markesinis’ own remarks at the Cour de Cassation, 
including criticism of von Bar, see Basil Markesinis, Deux cents ans dans la vie d'un code 
célèbre. Réflexions historiques et comparatives à propos des projets européens, RTD CIV. 
2004, 45-60;. English version: Two hundred years of a Famous Code – What Should We 
Be Celebrating?, 39 Tex. Int’l L.J. 561 (2004). 
14 Lequette (note 13) 23. 
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“politically complicitous, inherently oppressive, and fundamentally 
antihumanistic”15 and, in naming his article “Antivonbar”, invokes a tradition of 
polemical ad hominem attacks like Frederic the Great’s Anti-Machiavell, Lessing’s 
Anti-Goeze or Engels’ Anti-Dühring. The authors of European private law are 
considered “desindividus, dont l’expérience fait apparaître qu’ils sont dépourvus
de tout scrupule.”16 When von Bar suggests that France and Germany were once 
one, under Charlemagne, he finds the response that the third Reich used the same 
argument to justify the collaboration.17  
2. Second Reaction: Rearmament: Reform of the Code Civil 
The shock —sometimes referred to as an electric shock18—a led to action.19 
Scholars presented the Avant-projet Catala, aimed at a reform of the French law of 
obligations.20 Although the project may look purely domestic, both its origin and its 
aim are deeply European.21 It was spurred by a conference that compared the Lando 
Principles and the French Code Civil and found important differences.22 The threat 
of a European Code civil that would differ from French law was thus an important 
                                               
15 Pierre Legrand, Antivonbar, (2005) 1 Journal of Comparative Law 13, 27. 
16 Yves Lequette, Le Code européen est de retour, (2011) Revue des contrats 1028, 1031 
note 15. 
17  Lequette (note 16) 1042, citing to Bernard Bruneteau,“L’Europe nouvelle” de Hitler: Une 
illusion des intellectuels de la France de Vichy (2003). Charlemagne has always been 
claimed for both French and German national identity; see, most recently, Robert John 
Morrissey, Charlemagne & France: a thousand years of mythology (2003). For the 
historical Charlemagne’s role for Europe, see Rosamond McKitterick Charlemagne: The 
Formation of a European Identity (2008). 
18 Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson & Sara Patris-Godechot, Le Code civil face à son destin 
(2006) 153. 
19 A useful summary and evaluation in English is Ruth Sefton-Green, The DCFR, the 
Avant-projet Catala and French Legal Scholars: A Story of Cat and Mouse?, (2008) 12 
Edinburgh Law Review 351. 
20  Pierre Catala (ed.) Avant-projet de réforme du droit des obligations et de la prescription 
(La documentation Franc aise, Paris, 2006); English translation by John Cartwright/Simon 
Whittaker, in John Cartwright/Stefan Vogenauer/Simon Whittaker (eds), Reforming the 
French Law of Obligations: Comparative Reflections on the Avant-projet de reforme du 
droit des obligations et de la prescription (‘the Avant-projet Catala) (2009) 445. For a 
helpful introduction in English, see Stefan Vogenauer, The Avant-projet de réforme: An 
Overview, ibid. at 3. The entire book has been published in French, too: John 
Cartwright/Stefan Vogenauer/Simon Whittaker (eds), Regards comparatistes sur l’avant-
projet de réforme du droit des obligations et de la prescription (2010). 
21 Séverine Nadaud, Codifier le droit civil européen (2008) 321-36. 
22 Pierre Catala, General Presentation of the Reform Proposals, in Cartwright/Whittaker 
(note 20) 9, no 2. See Dominique Fenouillet & Pauline Rémy-Corlay (eds), Les concepts 
contractuels  à l’heure des principes du droit europén des contrats (2003).  
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reason for the response.23 Catala provides yet another military reference, this one 
quite stunning: it will not do to say that things are good enough as they are, because 
that was what the French on the eve of the desaster of 1940.24 Hitler’s invasion 
found the French unprepared; von Bar will find more resistance. 
The aim is not just to protect the French code, however, but also to regain influence 
on Europe:25  “Our hope is that the Reform Proposals serve the purpose which will 
give France a civil law adapted to its time and a voice at the table of Europe.”26 Not 
least towards that purpose, the commission almost immediately requested 
translations into five  languages (including two different translations into English), 
thus greatly broadening the potential audience.27 
Reactions to the project, both within and outside of France,28 were largely positive, 
though the project was also lambasted as “franco-français”.29 The near-total 
absence of comparative law influence was one reason for criticism.30 Puzzlement 
emerged especially over the commission’s decision to maintain, and even extend, 
“in accordance with our legal tradition,”31 the role of la cause.32 The cause in 
                                               
23 Denis Mazeaud, Observations conclusives, Revue des contrats 2006, 179. 
24 Pierre Catala, L’avant-projet de réforme des obligations et le droit des affaires, in Vincent 
Sagaert (ed.), La réforme du droit privé en France – Un modèle pour le droit privé 
européen? (2009) 85, 85. 
25 Sébastian Pimont, À propos du processus de réforme du droit français des contrats, 
Revue juridique Thémis 43 (2009) 439, 443ff. 
26  Catala (note 22) no. 9; cf. Catala (note 24) 87: “Qui ne voit que, dans le Concert des 
Nations, la voix et le poids de la France sortiraient renforcés de son Code civil?” The hope 
that the French Code civil could provide a model has long accompanied reform projects. 
Claude Witz, “La longue gestation d’un code européen des contrats – Rappel de quelques 
initiatives oubliées”, (2003) RTDC 447. 
27 Collected in Pierre Catala (ed), L’art de traduction: L’accueil international de l’avant-
projet de réforme du droit des obligations (2011). 
28 Summarized by Vogenauer (supra note 20) 15-17. 
29 Denis Tallon, Teneur et valeur du projet appréhendé dans une perspective comparative, 
Revue des contrats 2006, 131; Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson, “La réforme du droit 
francais des contrats: perspective comparative”, Revue des contrats 2006, p.147. 
30 See Denis Tallon, Teneur et valeur du projet appréhendé dans une perspective 
comparative, Revue des contrats 2006, 132; Christophe Jamin, Vers un droit européen des 
contrats? (Réflexion sur une double stratégie), (2006) RTD com. 94, 101. 
31 Jacques Ghestin, Validity—Cause (articles 1124 to 1126-1), in 
Cartwright/Vogenauer/Whittaker (note 20) 521 (originally in Catala (note 20) 25. 
32 Cf., in English, Judith Rochfeld, A Future for la cause? Observations of a French Jurist, 
in John Cartwright/Stefan Vogenauer/Simon Whittaker (eds), Reforming the French Law of 
Obligations: Comparative Reflections on the Avant-projet de reforme du droit des 
obligations et de la prescription (‘the Avant-projet Catala) (2009) 73; Ruth Sefton-Green, 
La cause or the Length of the French Judiciary’s Foot, ibid at 101. 
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particular was deemed unlikely to be influential in Europe.33 In result, this 
assessment seems fair: la cause had become a French peculiarity in Europe34 (even 
though its Aristotelian origins are of course not at all peculiarly French). The 
authors of the Lando Principles had explicitly rejected it (to the surprise and dismay 
of French commentators.)35 But the critique misses what the project is about. The 
goal was to influence European private law, not the other way around. In this sense, 
differences between the Code and the Lando Principles were not a problem but a 
potential asset.36 The cause is thus defended precisely because it is un-European:37 
Comment pourrait-on, au demeurant, aspirer à ce que la France reste elle-meme et 
cultive son irritante exception alors que sa banalisation et sa dissolution dans le 
conformisme européen ouvrent à ceux qui en sont les artisans des perspectives si 
chatoyantes?38 
The project was not ultimately successful. The chancellery adopted its own 
project,39 using more comparative law than the Catala Avant-projet and suggesting 
abolition of la cause.40 Academics around François Terré prepared a counter-
counterproposal.41 Whether any one of them will become law is not yet fully 
certain. 
 
                                               
33 Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson, “La réforme du droit franc ais des contrats: perspective 
comparative”, RDC 2006, p.147; Muriel Fabre-Magnan, Entretien, La Semaine Juridique 
(JCP) éd. Gén. 2008.I.199; Denis Mazeaud, Réforme du droit des contrats: haro, en 
Hérault, sur le projet!, D. 2008, 2675, nos 9-11. 
34 Cf. Vittoria Bassani/Wolfgang Mincke, Europa sine causa?, (1997) ZEuP  599. 
35 Jean Beauchard, L’absence de la cause dans les principes européens de droit des 
contrats, in Jean-Pierre Marguénaud, Michel Massé, Nadine Poulet-Gibot (eds), Apprendre 
à douter. Questions de droit, questions sur le droit, Études offertes à Claude Lombois 
(2004) 819. 
36 Catala (note 22) no 8.  
37 Alain Ghozi & Yves Lequette, La réforme du droit des contrats: brèves observations sur 
le projet de la chancellerie, D. 2008, 2609. 
38 Lequette (note 16) 1031. Similarly Miguel Pasquau Liaño, L’abandon de la notion de 
“cause” en droit franc ais : un service au droit européen des contrats ?, (2010) 1 Revue 
de droit d’Assas 68, 69: “cacher la cause pour surmonter l’isolément du droit franc ais 
n’est pas tellement différent de ce qui supposerait de renoncer à la langue franc aise pour 
favoriser l’intégration linguistique des peuples européens.” 
39 Denis Mazeaud, La réforme du droit français des contrats, Revue juridique Thémis 44 
(2010) 243. 
40 Christian Larroumet, De la cause de l’obligation à l’intérêt au contrat, D. 2008, 2441.  
41 François Terré (ed), Pour une réforme du droit des contrats (2008).  
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3. Third Reaction: Counterattack: French Participation in Europeanization 
If the reform of French law has an only indirect impact on French law, other French 
projects aim at direct participation in the development of European law. Yet 
another (rather incredible) military argument is suggested in favor of uniformity of 
law (albeit on the basis of French law): the German-French war of 1870/71 could 
have been avoided if only Prussia had adopted the French Civil Code.42 In 
particular, two French legal association joined the European network in 2005: the 
Association Henri Capitant des Amis de la Culture Juridique Française and the 
Société de législation comparée. Given how far European projects had advanced 
with limited French input, not many areas for influence remained, but two were 
found and published in 2008: “Terminologie contractuelle commune” and 
“Principes contractuels communs”. The hope was that this could influence the 
European project even at this late stage: 
There are a number of ways in which this work could contribute to the wider European 
project. The work on the guiding principles could form part of the CFR, in the form of 
blackletter model rules or of recitals.  The work on terminology is, in itself, most useful 
for the elaboration of the final version of the CFR. It finds its place with the materials 
which will accompany the model rules. Last but not least : the revised version of the 
Principles of European contract law (PECL) should be considered, by the European 
institutions, as an alternative set of model rules on contract law. As PECL, it adopts a 
simple structure, with clear and concise rules. This revised version includes comments 
on PECL which are particularly innovative and valuable.”43 
Their success has been moderate. Granted, the European Parliament singled out these 
works as relevant; the authors of the Draft Common Frame of Reference reformulated, 
under their influence, the “principles” underlying their codification.44 Their rules however 
were not changed much, and the Commission seems not to have paid a lot of attention to 
                                               
42 Philippe Malaurie, Le code civil europén des obligations et des contrats – Une question 
toujours ouverte, JCP 2002.1.110 no 11 = Pensée juridique (note 6) 219, 224. 
43 See also Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson, Droit europén des contrats: les offres sont 
faites, les dés non encore jetés, D. 2008, 557. 
44 For criticism, see Martijn Hesselink, 'If You Don’t Like our Principles We Have Others'; 
On Core Values and Underlying Principles in European Private Law: A Critical Discussion 
of the New 'Principles' Section in the Draft CFR, in The Foundations of European Private 
Law, pp. 59-72, (R. Brownsword, H. Micklitz, L. Niglia & S. Weatherill, eds., 2011). 
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them. The French authors of these works are, in the words of one French critic, like 
Lenin’s “useful idiots”45. 
III. Cultural Images 
In defending a French against a European Code, French critics invoke a number of 
arguments, but they can be grouped, roughly, under two headings: cultural, and political. 
Among the cultural topics, the most frequent argument holds the culture of a French 
Code against the lack of culture of a European Code. Closer analysis reveals that the 
opposite is argued as well: a European Code must be rejected precisely because it 
represents a culture. 
1. Tradition versus Revolution 
In one frequent juxtaposition, the French code is the fruit of tradition, while a European 
Code would represent a break with traditions. Lequette recounts how generations of 
French professors synthesized the principles of French law, until the code civil could be 
written in less than four months, based widely on the writings of Pothier46. Similarly, the 
Catala project starts with praise for Portalis and Carbonnier, both of whom “had the same 
perspective of history, a deep understanding of the customs and traditions which make up 
the ‘spirit of the centuries’ and the sense that ‘it is right to save everything that it is not 
necessary to destroy”.47 As Portalis said, “The Codes of nations are the fruit of the 
passage of time; but properly speaking, we do not make them.” The European code, this 
implies, is not just  “étranger à la culture francaise,”48 but opposed to all culture: it has no 
tradition at all – the ius commune not withstanding.49 The unity created by the French 
code had grown over centuries, while the unity created by a European code has not.50 The 
European code project is thus an “utopie … sans racines historiques ni culturelles,”51 It 
breaks, in other words, with existing tradition. 
                                               
45 Lequette (note 16) 1031. 
46  Lequette (note 13) no. 24; See also Jean-Louis Halpérin, L’impossible code civil (1992). 
47 Catala (note 22) no 1. 
48 Philippe Malaurie, “Petite note sur le projet de réforme du droit des contrats”, JCP (G) 
2008.I.204. 
49 Cf. Jean-Louis Halpérin, Retour à un droit commun européen, in Pensée juridique (note 
6) 15. 
50 Lequette, (note 8) 31-32. 
51 Philippe Malaurie, L’utopie et le bicentenaire du Code Civil, in 1804-2004 (note 8) 1, 7-8. 
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This is ironic. After all, such breaking with traditions is intrinsic to the French Code civil, 
too. When the Code civil was established, after the Revolution, one main purpose was to 
supplant old traditions—legal traditions, especially those of droit commun and droit écrit, 
but also, of course, ideological traditions of the ancien régime. Tellingly, then, the civil 
code is today advertised as the proper instrument of legal reform for such countries that 
lack their own legal tradition.52 And now, it is the European Civil Code that is criticized 
as being stuck in tradition. Christian von Bar is ridiculed for placing the Code in the 
tradition of Charlemagne, and thus ignoring the 1200 years of subsequent history.53  
2. Language: National vs. Universal Language 
 
A related issue concerns language, an issue invoked far more frequently in France than 
elsewhere. The code civil is intrinsically linked to the French language.54 The Code is 
regularly praised frequently for its style, for its clarity. Stendhal, thus the oft-repeated 
legend, would read a line from the code before writing any lines, in order to clarify his 
style.55 Moreover, the Code civil itself is like a language. European law, by contrast, has 
no such language;56 it is, in the words of one critic, a legal Babel.57 And a European Code 
would not resemble a grown language but would be artificial—a “volapük juridique,”58 
                                               
52 Association Henri Capitant des amis de la culture juridique française, Les droits de 
tradition civiliste en question—À propos des Rapports Doing Business de la Banque 
Mondiale (2006) 82. 
53 Lequette (note 20) no. 11; Lequette (note 16) 1042. 
54 Gérard Cornu, L’art d’écrire la loi, in (2003) 107 Pouvoirs – Le code civil 5. 
55 Stendhal may have been partly in jest; the legend has been used less to praise the Code 
and more to criticize Stendhal. See M.L. Newman, Stendhal and the Code civil, (1970) 43 
The French Review 434.  
56 Gérard Cornu, Un code civil n’est pas un instrument communautaire, Dalloz 2002 chron. 
351 = Pensée juridique 57, 58: “Il n’y a pas de langue européenne.” 
57 Malaurie (note 12) no 13, p. 225. 
58 Lequette (note 13) no 13 ; Lequette (note 16) 1044. See for the term already Edmond 
Picard, Le droit et sa diversité nécessaire  d’après les races et les nations, Clunet 28 
(1901) 417, 422 ; Gérard Blandin, Les interférences de la linguistique et du droit, in Nicole 
M. le Douarin & Cathérine Puigelier (eds), Science, Éthique et Droit (2007) 33, 58.  
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an “Esperanto juridique”59. It would thus share the fate of other artificial languages with 
no depth.60 
Again, however, this pair of images is found reversed. In the reversal, the French code 
civil itself overcame the “babel juridique”61 of different laws and languages in France. 
More, the Code Civil represents a universal language beyond France: Not only has the 
Code civil provided a model for numerous other codes;62, it has been translated numerous 
times. In the same vein, the Avant-Projet Catala was translated into six different 
languages to increase immediately its global reception. In this image, the strength of the 
Code Civil lies not in its close link to French language but rather in the universality of its 
language, its translatability. And now it is the European code, by contrast, that has its 
own peculiar language. In one way, this is the technical language of European 
bureaucracy – a language particular not to one specific country but to one group, and 
therefore not universal. Or, worse, the peculiar language of the European Code is 
English—the language of a common law system!63 In response to this universalism, the 
French no longer oppose a babel juridique; they now insist on linguistic pluralism (by 
which they mean: the use French in addition to English).  
3. Values versus Neutral Rationality 
A third pair of images concerns the spirit of the law, especially (cultural) values and 
neutral rationality. Often, we read that private law concerns, primarily, “la culture, 
l’identité, la psychologie collective … de chaque peuple.” The French Code civil 
represents such values from the beginning, but it has also, in turn, entered into the French 
                                               
59 Nicolas Charbit, L’esperanto du droit ? La rencontre du droit communautaire et du droit 
des contrats, JCP G 2002.1.100 ; Claude Witz, Remarques conclusives, Rev. Int. Dr. 
Comp. 2003, 1033, 1034; Yves Lequette, Vers un code civil européen ?, in (2003) 107 
Pouvoirs – Le code civil, 97, 110. Previously, the Lando Principles had been called an 
espéranto du droit by J. Raynard, Les principes du droit européen du contrat: une lex 
mercatoria à la mode européenne?, Rev. Trim. Dr. Civ. 1998, 1006.   
60 On these, see Umberto Eco The Search for the Perfect Language (1995). 
61 M. de Valroger, Origines de nos institutions coutumiéres, Revue critique de legislation et 
de jurisprudence 10 (1857) 239 247. 
62 Sylvain Soleil, Le code civil de 1804 a-t-il été conçu comme un modèle juridique pour les 
nations? (2005), http://fhi.rg.mpg.de/debatte/Code%20Civil/pdf%20files/0503soleil.pdf with 
references in note 2. 
63 Cf. Ruth Sefton-Green, Sense and Sensibilities:The DCFR and the Preservation of 
Cultural and Linguistic Plurality, (2008) ERCL 281; id., How far can we go when using the 
English language for private law in the EU?, (2012) ERCL 30. 
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consciousness.64 This emphasis on cultural values includes the law of contracts, which is 
cultural (and thus necessarily linked to the nation state.)65 A European Civil Code, by 
contrast, has no spirit, no soul; it is “un syncrétisme juridique purement technique, sans 
racine, sans esprit et sans âme, de nulle part et de nulle époque”66 Or, at best, it represents 
a cold economic rationality—like the common law, which the Doing Business Report 
appears to prefer, which (it is said) prioritizes efficiency over values. 
And yet, in the flip version of the argument, it is the European Code which rests on 
values—thought they are the wrong ones. The authors of the Code are biased—main 
proponents like Christian von Bar and Bénédicte Fauvqraue-Cosson (the French member 
in the Commission).67 By contrast, neutral institutions are opposed to the Code, among 
them the Fédération bancaire francaise and the Mouvement des Entreprises de France.68 
And indeed, in this juxtaposition the quality of the French code civil is precisely how it 
overcame the various irrational cultures of the ancien régime and replaced them with the 
rationality of natural law. 
 
IV. Political Images 
Related ideas concern not culture but politics. There is no doubt that the French Code 
civil is a political symbol, and a European Code would aim at the same role. Here, 
however, I want to focus only on political legitimacy. Legitimacy can refer to a code’s 
internal legitimacy, and it can refer to external legitimacy towards other countries. 
1. Democracy vs. Technocracy 
First internal legitimacy. In one pair of images, the code stands for French sovereignty, 
fought for through revolution and the liberation from feudalism, and thus for democracy 
and sovereignty. The code civil thus retains an eminently public, even constitutional, 
character;  it is a “constitution civile.”69 In particular, the ban on case law in its Article 5 
                                               
64 Cornu (note 56) 59. 
65 Thomas Genicon, Commission europénne et droit des contrats: “quousque tandem 
abutere patientia nostra?”, (2011) Revue de contrats 1050, 1057-58. 
66 Malaurie (note 48). 
67 Lequette (note 16) 1032. 
68 Lequette (note 16) 1033-34. 
69 Jean Carbonnier, Le Code Civil, in II Les lieux de mémoire – La Nation 293 (P. Nora 
ed.); cf. Yves Gaudement, Le Code Civil, “Constitution Civile de la France”, in 1804-2004 
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is viewed as an expression of democracy70—even though of course case law plays a 
prominent role in France today, and legal systems with a case law like the English one 
can hardly be called undemocractic. And the code is an emblem of democracy—even if it 
did not arise from a democratic process, it displays, in the words of Raymond Troplong 
in the 19th century, an “esprit démocratique.”71 An EU code, by contrast, has no basis in 
the Treaties,72 and the entire European Union lacks legitimacy, at least beyond economic 
law.73 The occasional suggestion that a European code could one day become the civil 
Constitution of Europe74 is not popular in France. Moreover, the group developing a 
European code lacks democratic legitimacy, given that it consists only of experts not 
appointed by any state75. Nor do the EU institutions have the necessary legitimacy in 
participatory democracy.76 Theirs is a product based on technocratic expertise, not 
popular vote—a project favored by a bureaucracy that wants to extend its powers just 
because it is there, like the Soviet nomenklatura.77 
There is, however, again a contrasting pair of images. In this contrasting pair, the French 
Code stands for the genius not of democracy but of monarchy and imperialism. 
Monarchism is present in the continued veneration of Napoléon Bonaparte’s active role 
in the makin of the French Code.78 Napoléon’s famous quote, according to which his 
code will be the basis of his fame more than any military victories, is cited incessantly 
(though abridged).79 The code is an imperial code, says Jean Foyer in admiration.80 (It is 
                                                                                                                                  
(note 8) 297; Rémy Cabrillac, Le Code civil est-il la véritable constitution de la France ?, 
(2005) 39 Revue juridique Thémis 245. 
70 Jérome Huet, Union europénne et démocratice: prohibition des arrets de règlement et 
avis de l’article 5 du Code civil, (2010) JCP 790. 
71 Cf Jean-François Niort, Le Code civil dans la melée politique et sociale—Regards sur 
deux siècles d’un symbole national, (2005) RTD civ. 257, 281-83. 
72 Most recently Genicon (note 65) 1056. 
73 Lequette (note 16) 1037-38. 
74 Vlad Constantinesco, La “codification” communautaire du droit privé, future constitutiona 
civile de l’Europe?, in De code en code—Mélanges Georges Wiederkehr (2009) 111. 
75  Lequette, (note 13) no. 17. 
76 Cécile Peres, Livre vert de la Commission européenne: les sources contractuelles à 
l’heure de la démocratie participative, (2011) Revue des contrats 13. 
77 Lequette (note 16) 1040. 
78 Eckhard Maria Theewen, Napoleons Anteil am Code civil (1991)); Jean-Louis Sourioux, 
Le role du remier Consul dans les travaux préparatoires du Code Civil, in 1804-2004 (note 
8) 107 ; cf. Jean-Louis Halpérin, L’histoire de la fabrication du code. Le code: Napoléon?, 
(2003) 107 Pouvoirs – Le code civil 11. 
79 The quote is usually given as “Ce que rien n'effacera, ce qui vivra éternellement, c'est 
mon Code civil.” The original quote continues with rather mundane things that will live on 
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also a professorial Code—the Avant-projet Catala, like the Lando Principles, was 
authored by self-appointed professors, not by public vote.)81 And now the problem of the 
European Code is that it is not imperial enough. It is doubtful that the European project 
can succeed unless it is supported by “la magie, un charisme de géant.”82 Von Bar may be 
Pol Pot, but he is no Napoleon.  
2. Self-Determination vs. Imperialism 
Closely related is the idea that the French Code Civil is an emblem of national 
sovereignty and self-determination. France, we read, brought the idea of (national) 
sovereignty to Europe,83 and the French Code is an expression of that sovereignty. The 
Code is a Code by and for the French. As such, it defies hegemonialist tendencies: “le 
droit français n’a conçu d’ambition pour autrui, seulement appliqué à se réformer lui-
meme.”84 But if French law is the lamb, European law is the wolf85 that will not allow 
such self-determination. What is aimed for –  “un super-Etat qui domine les Etats 
subordonnés,”86 – is hegemonialist. The project for a European Civil Code is a 
totalitarian one,87 directed against such self-determination. 
Again, this pair can be found flipped as well. The French Code is about French self-
determination, but towards others it has also always been about imperialism. The 
expansion of the Code around Europe and the world88 has always been a way for France 
to impose its power. That this influence has already declined89 is deplored because it 
reduces the power of France over other countries. This leads to an opposite argument for 
the French Code: the French Code perpetuates also European influence on foreign 
                                                                                                                                  
as well: “ce sont les procès-verbaux de mon conseil d’État; ce sont les recueils de ma 
correspondance avec mes ministres; c’est enfin tout le bien que j’ai fait comme 
administrateur, comme réorganisateur de la grande famille française.” Charles Tristan 
Montholon, Récits de la Captivité de l'Empereur Napoléon à Sainte-Hélène I (1847) 401. 
80 Jean Foyer, Le code civil de 1945 à nos jours, in 1804-2004 (note 8) 275. 
81 Sefton-(note 19) 354. 
82 Jean Carbonnier, Le Code civil des Français dans la mémoire collective, in 1804-2004 
(note 8) 1045. 
83 Lequette (note 12) 412. 
84 Cornu (note 56) 60. 
85 Cornu (note 56) 60. A similar metaphor can be found in Genicon (note 65) 1053. 
86 Lequette (note 16) 1040. 
87 Cornu (note 56) 60; Lequette (note 8) 28.  
88 Fauvarque-Cosson/Patris-Godechot (note 18) 15 ff. 
89 Fauvarque-Cosson/Patris-Godechot (note 18) 73 ff; Filippo Ranieri, L'influence du Code 
civil sur les codifications du 19éme siècle: essor et déclin d'un modèle européen," in Liber 
Amicorum Guido Alpa. Private Law Beyond National Systems (2007) 831.  
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countries.90 If the code civil is lost, European influence on the rest of the world will 
suffer. Even a reform of the French Code alone will reduce this influence if it makes the 
Code less French by abandoning la cause.91 A European civil code cannot likely flourish 
in the same way,92 not least because the drafters of a European Code forget about the 
importance of  imperialist thought.  
3. Pluralism vs. Universality 
A last pair of images is that of uniformity and pluralism. The Portalis quote mentioned in 
the introduction is a frequent reference in France: laws must be made differently for 
different peoples.93 The French Code is inseparably linked to French identity – it is based 
on this identity and in turn contributes to this identity. The same is true in theory for other 
countries (even though French authors do not pay particular attention to those.)94 
European codification aims at establishing (or reestablishing) a European culture95, a 
European national identity.96 But this is futile: A European Code would be a utopia, the 
law of no place, a false empty universalism. The uniformity brought about by a European 
Code would be a futile attempt to erase differences between peoples, “un levier 
permettant d’accentuer et d’accélérer la fusion des peuples de l’Europe en une seule 
entité.”97 Europe is necessarily plural;98 its plurality is that of nation states: “le génie de 
l’Europe tient dans sa profonde diversité”.99 Cabrillac suggests that “la nation doit 
précéder le Code et non l’inverse”   
                                               
90 Lequette (note 13) no. 13 
91 Pierre Catala, Deux regards inhabituels sur la cause dans les contrats, Répertoire du 
notariat Defrénois 2008, 2365, 2373-2381. 
92 Jean Foyer, Le code civil de 1945 à nos jours, in 1804-2004 (note 8) 275, 296. 
93 Malaurie (note 12) no 12, p. 225. 
94 Cf. Cornu (note 56) 57. 
95 On which see Ralf Michaels, Legal Culture, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of European 
Private Law (2012) 1060. 
96  Christian Kirchner, A “European Civil Code”: Potential, Conceptual, and Methodological 
Implications, 31 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 671, 673 (1998). 
97 Lequette (note 16) 1040. 
98 Lequette (note 16)1041. 
99 Alain Ghozi & Raymonde Vatinet, Response to the 2010 Green Paper, 
 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/0052/contributions/164_fr.pdf, p. 5. 
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And yet this is a strange flip of the old image of  the French Code as universalist and 
antipluralist.100 Portalis was the first to emphasize how the Code civil overcame regional 
identities: 
Nous ne sommes plus Provençaux, Bretons, Alsaciens, mais Français … la loi est la mère 
commune des citoyens, elle leur accorde une égale protection à tous.101 
Lequette makes the same point in favor of nations, now against a Europe of Regions: 
Les régions qui sont appelées à prendre la suite des nations se définissent, en effet, dans 
la conception allemande par une communauté, rélle ou plus ou moins fantasmatique, 
d’essence ethnique: les Corses, les Basques, les Flamands, les Bretons, les Provençeaux, 
les Occitans, les Savoyards, etc.102  
In fact, we might say that the French Code civil was not made by the nation; it made the 
nation—an insight that would mirror Anderson’s point that nation states create the 
nations they embody, not the other way round.103 And this universalism works externally 
as well. From the beginning, the natural law ideas underlying the Code aimed at potential 
universality.104 The code is “l’expression d’un droit naturel universel et d’un véritable jus 
commune valable en tous pays;”105 this universalism was a core reason for its global 
success.106  but this is true only for a grown code like the French one. A European Civil 
Code, as a mere collection of rules, could not achieve the same universal character.107 
V. What to Make of all This 
The main gist of all these arguments may seem obvious. Where a European Code 
threatens to replace the code civil with something different, it must be opposed. Where, 
by contrast, the code civil is allowed to become a European Code—whether directly, 
                                               
100 Norbert Rouland, L’État français et le pluralisme: histoire politique des institutions 
publiques de 476 à 1792 (1995) 332 ff. 
101 Portalis, Motifs, in Code civil français: Discours et exposé des motifs IV (1804) 489 at 
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105 Bruno Oppetit, L’avenir de la codification, 24 (1996) Droits 73, 74. 
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107 Ibid. But cf. Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson, Codification et droit privé européen, in 
Études à la mémoire du Professeur Bruno Oppetit (2009) 179 (suggesting that European 
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through adoption elsewhere, or indirectly, through stronger influence on European 
lawmaking, Europeanization is supported. The arguments for national particularity and 
self-determination apply to France, not really to others. The French internationalism is, in 
reality, a French hegemonialism. If this is so, then nationalism and internationalism are 
two sides of the same coin and mutually consistent positions—even if the images of code 
that are used for their support are not. 
And yet, this alone does not prove the counterposition right. It does not seem crazy for 
French critics to view the German position towards a European civil code as an 
imperialist one.108 If the Germans are more influential at the moment, this may be all the 
more reason to oppose them. Moreover, although the positions of critics are internally 
incoherent, quite likely the same dichotomy could be demonstrated amongst proponents 
of a European code who face the same problem—to defend one code against another.  
It would thus be inadequate to reject the French positions as signs of parochialism and 
nationalistic arrogance. Of course they are, but not necessarily any more so than those of 
proponents of a European Code. Nationalism may have a pejorative meaning today. But 
if Lequette is right and its opposition is empire, then it is not clear which is better.109 
Moreover, we know that nationalism tends to rise in times of turmoil and crises of 
legitimacy—either after revolutions, or in face of outside pressure. France is experiencing 
a time of outside pressure, with a growing feeling that French law and the Code Civil are 
in decline.110 No wonder that people remember fondly the time of the Code’s greatest 
strength. 
I believe we gain more if we take the inconsistencies in the French position as 
representative not just of the French but instead of modern law more generally. What we 
see is an expression of a general problem of both modern law, especially in the traditional 
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form of codification,111 and of nationalism (which of course once was modern)—the 
tension between nationalism and universalism,112 internal peace and external violence, 
between inclusion and exclusion,113 rationalism and antirationalism.114 Such tensions can 
be patched over within one legal system, but where two structurally comparable projects 
confront each other, they come to the fore. If the critics fail to present a coherent defense 
of the French code civil, they are nonetheless successful in the critique of a European 
code, insofar as the inconsistency of their position applies to the latter as well. If the 
French code falls, so does the European code. 
Inconsistency is not necessarily failure—it can, and often is, overcome by an act of 
faith.115 George Fletcher once referred to the Code as one of three “nearly sacred books” 
of the Western legal tradition.116 Indeed, its veneration has always had somewhat 
religious characteristics;117 its support seems a matter not just of ratonality but of faith. 
This matches not only Alain Supiot’s suggestion for a religious basis of our modern 
law.118 It is also in accordance with Ulrich Wehler’s suggestion that nationalism has a 
quasi-religious element to it.119 The French code civil, like the French nation, may once 
have been the essence of modernity. Against the conflicting modernity of the EU and a 
European Code, it is reinvented as a premodern artefact, worthy of protection just 
because it is there. 
And yet, the frequent invocation of military metaphors are worrying. What we see is 
reminiscent of a religious war. Different sects within the same religion (the civil law) 
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fight aggressively, although—or perhaps because—their positions are so close to each 
other. And they request two things simultaneously: the freedom to exercise their religion 
(expressed as nationalism) , and the recognition of their religion as the official one 
(expressed as internationalism.)  Now, Europe has its experience with such religious 
wars. Perhaps, in due course, the differences between a French and a European Code will 
look as subtle as those between Protestants and Catholics look to many of us today. Until 
then, it would be foolish to underestimate their potential. 
